The London Life Insurance Company v. Chase [1963] S.C.R. 267 by W., R. L.
Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 3, Number 2 (April 1965) Article 25
The London Life Insurance Company v. Chase
[1963] S.C.R. 267
R. L. W.
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Commentary
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Osgoode Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
W., R. L.. "The London Life Insurance Company v. Chase [1963] S.C.R. 267." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 3.2 (1965) : 250-251.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol3/iss2/25
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
The judgment of the Supreme Court was delivered by Judson J. In
dismissing the appeal the reasons of the Court of Appeal were
adopted based as they were on the earlier decision of the Supreme
Court in Andrews and George. The Featherstone case was disap-
proved. Particular attention it would seem was paid to the holding
by Sheppard J.A. that "liability assumed under contract" and "liability
imposed by law" where for one and the same loss and hence caught
by the exclusion clause. For this reason, though no opinion was ex-
pressed, it may be possible in a later case to avoid the present result
when the "same loss" test cannot be applied. R.L.W.
The London Life Insurance Company v. Chase [1963] S.C.R. 267.
The Supreme Court in a rather tragic case was given the oppor-
tunity to consider the burden of proof resting on those alleging the
commission of a criminal or quasi-criminal offence in civil proceedings.
The late Robert Leroy Chase, the respondent's husband, was an
apparently normal young man of twenty-three, living in his own home
with his wife and two children and gainfully employed. On the
evening of May 1st, 1959 on returning from a "stag" party he kissed
his wife dozing in the living room and then went in succession from
the bathroom to a storage room in the rear of the house. His wife
heard a noise and on entering the storage room found the deceased
lying prone, a rifle beside him, and with a fatal bullet wound in his
right temple. The appellant Insurance Company disclaimed liability
on a life insurance policy on the deceased's life by reason of an
exclusion clause which read as follows:
In case the life insured shall die by his own hand whether sane or Insane,
within two years from the date on which this policy is issued, the liability
of the company hereunder shall be limited to an amount equal to the
premiums paid on the policy without interest.
The appellant produced the evidence of a qualified expert that
having regard to the nature of the wound, the position of the body
and the character of the rifle, suicide was the only logical explanation
of the death. The trial judge held the Insurance Company had not
satisfied the onus resting on it to prove the commission of suicide
and ordered payment of the proceeds of the policy to the respondent
widow. This judgment was affirmed by a majority of the Manitoba
Court of Appeal.
The appellant brought its appeal to the Supreme Court alleging
that the trial judge and the majority of the Court of Appeal had
misdirected themselves as to the proper standard of proof applicable
to the circumstances. They relied on excerpts from the lower court
judgments as indicating the judges had applied the criminal or even
higher standard of proof.
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Bastin J. had said at trial:
I have come to the conclusion that however unlikely accident may be as
an explanation of the death it is not beyond all possibility and it is not
more unlikely than that this normal, cheerful, happy young man deliber-
ately took his life.
In the Court of Appeal in delivering the decision of the majority
Schultz J. had used equally strong language. Ritchie J. speaking for
the Supreme Court in dismissing the appeal refused to view segments
of the lower judgments in isolation:
After considering the decisions of Bastin J. and Schultz J. in their entirety,
I cannot say that they adopted any standard other than that of weighingthe probabilities and improbabilities of the plaintiff's case against those
of the case of the defendant and that having due regard to the seriousness t  all gation of suicide and t e complete absence of motive they con-
cluded the preponderance of evidence weighed in the plaintiff's favour.
The learned judge considered this approach to be in complete
accord with the rule accepted in earlier decisions of the Supreme
Court.1 This was undoubtedly sufficient to dispose of the case but
Ritchie 3. felt compelled to deal with this strong dissent of Tritschler
J.A. in the Court of Appeal that had been relied on largely by the
appellant. The majority in the Court of Appeal had placed consider-
able weight on the fact that no evidence of motive had been produced
by the appellant. Ttschler J.A. felt that the failure of the appellant
to produce evidence of motive should never be decisive against him,
that the proof of suicide was to be sought in the circumstances of the
death and in his opinion these circumstances forced him to the con-
clusion th hedat  death was self-inflictete wtient. Ritchie .
admitted that evidence of motive was of little probative value in
rebutting the presumption against suicide but in his opinion it did not
necessarily follow that the complete absence of evidence of motive
when taken in conjunction with the unnatural quality of the act of
self-destruction can never be a decisive factor in support of the theory
that death was accidental.
R.L.W.
The Lonon o Lancashire Guarantee Accident Co. o Canada v.
Canadian Marconi Co., [1963] S.C.R. 106.
Is the presence of a high amount of alcohol in a blood sample
taken from the deceased enough to discharge te hburden resting on
the appellant of proving that the deceased was intoxicated? What is
the burden of proof in civil cases? Should the Supreme Court of
Canada disturb "concurrent findings" of two lower courts on a
question of fact? Is the right to appeal to the Supreme Court for
any matter involving more than ten thousand dollars a sound policy?
luarkn ta. The King (1921), 61 S.C.R. 608; wmith v. Smite nmidman, [1952]
2 S.C.R. 312; New Yorkc Life Insurance Co. v. Schlett [1945] S.C.R. 289; Indus-tria Acceptance Corporation v Couture, [1954] SC.R. 34; Hanes v. Wawanesa
Mutua Insurance Co., [1963] S.C.R. 154.
19641 251
